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Abstract: Humans have evolved cognitive processes favoring homogeneity, stability, and 
structure. These processes are, however, incompatible with a socially diverse world, raising 
wide academic and political concern about the future of modern societies. With data 
comprising 22 years of religious diversity worldwide, we show across multiple surveys that 
humans are inclined to react negatively to threats to homogeneity (i.e., changes in diversity 
are associated with lower self-reported quality of life, explained by a decrease in trust in 
others) in the short term. However, these negative outcomes are compensated in the long-
term by the beneficial influence of intergroup contact, which alleviates initial negative 
influences. This research advances knowledge that can foster peaceful coexistence in a new 
era defined by globalization and a socially diverse future.   
 
Significance Statement: Changes in social diversity constitute a key factor shaping today’s 
world. Yet, scholarly work about the consequences of diversity has been marked by a 
critical lack of consensus. To address this concern, we propose a novel and multidisciplinary 
approach where psychological, sociological, and evolutionary perspectives are integrated to 
provide an account of how individuals adapt to changes in social diversity. With an analysis 
of 22-years of worldwide data, our results suggest that humans are initially inclined to react 
negatively to threats to homogeneity, but that these negative effects are compensated in the 
long-term by the beneficial effects of intergroup contact. Our findings advance knowledge 
and inform political debate about one of the defining challenges of modern societies.  
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Global modernization has dramatically changed the demographic composition of most 
countries (1-3). Societies are in constant flux and current levels of intercultural exchange are 
transforming social ecosystems (4). Pessimistic appraisals about the potential effects of 
these changes have dominated recent and critical geopolitical events (e.g., the election of 
Donald Trump as President in the USA, Brexit in the UK, and the refugee crisis globally), 
but it is not yet known how living in a socially diverse world affects the quality of people’s 
lives. 
Models of human evolution applied to social diversity (1) support the notion that 
adaptation to a socially diverse context may be problematic and lead to negative outcomes. 
According to these models, the human brain evolved to sustain motivated cognition and 
behavior relevant to ingroup survival and cooperation, and to defend against potential 
threats from unknown outgroups (5). Humans are predisposed to distinguish ingroups from 
outgroups and this dichotomy is adaptive given that survival is contingent upon cooperation 
and reciprocity from other ingroup members (6, 7). Perhaps to facilitate this 
dichotomization, humans have evolved a preference for homogeneity and stability (8), as 
well as being with similar others (9). Moreover, outgroups are approached with a degree of 
uncertainty (10), as unknown others could be prey or predators, and caution in new 
encounters could dictate one’s survival. This reasoning is substantiated by influential work 
in the social sciences showing that interpersonal trust and social cohesion are lower in 
ethnically heterogeneous communities (11-13). Subsequent work across multiple disciplines 
expanded on these findings by revealing that social diversity is associated with conflict (14) 
and may have negative implications for economic growth (15) and public goods provision 
(16). The mechanism hypothesized to underlie these outcomes is that diversity erodes social 
cohesion and trust in others (17). Meta-analyses in the field of psychology substantiate this 
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reasoning by demonstrating that, at least initially, intergroup interactions can exacerbate 
intergroup bias, producing heightened stress, anxiety, and outgroup avoidance (18).  
Nonetheless, negative effects of diversity on trust have been contested by recent 
literature reviews (19, 20) and, despite the foregoing predispositions, it is known that the 
extension of cooperation to outgroups is hardly rare. Research on xenophilia (21) recognizes 
that humans share an impulse to engage in contact with other people, even those in 
outgroups. Indeed, biological and cultural anthropology contend that humans have evolved 
and fared better than other species because contact with outgroups brings a variety of 
benefits that cannot be attained by intragroup interactions. There is, for example, a 
biological advantage to gaining genetic variability through new mating opportunities (22) 
and intergroup contact allows individuals access to more diverse resources and knowledge 
(23). Archaeological and ethnographic evidence thus suggests that the benefits of trust and 
collaboration largely outweigh the potential costs of intergroup conflict, contributing to the 
proliferation of group-beneficial behaviors over time (5, 24). Indeed, research has 
demonstrated through a large body of work and meta-analyses that contact with outgroups 
reliably improves intergroup relations (25, 26). Studies indicate that diverse contexts create 
greater opportunities for intergroup contact, which in turn promotes trust and social 
cohesion (27).  
On balance, although a strong motivation for homophilous affiliation may be critical 
for within-group vitality and collaboration, it is more suited to the monocultural composition 
of ancestral social structures and less compatible with the social diversity typical of modern 
societies. We argue, however, that this incompatibility will dissipate over time given that, as 
societies become more diverse, individuals steadily reorient themselves by adopting 
outgroup-focused cognition and behaviors (1). Within this framework, we examine how 
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both negative (i.e., reduced trust stemming from diversity) and positive (i.e., increased trust 
through intergroup contact) effects operate to push or pull outcomes in either direction. 
Using worldwide data, we explore how these processes unfold in the context of 
growing religious diversity. Changes in religious diversity are shaping today’s world and 
provide a powerful context relevant to the aims of our study. People with different religious 
beliefs often have distinct norms, values, and worldviews that are the product of centuries of 
cultural evolution and cannot be easily changed or negotiated. Religion has historically been 
one of the strongest forces of human division, motivating expressions of intergroup hostility 
and outright warfare (28). Religion has most recently been at the forefront of public debate 
and political violence ranging from major incidents such as the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. to 
smaller but still deadly attacks in multiple European countries (e.g., U.K., France, and 
Spain). Today, religious diversity is of paramount relevance to societies as faith-based 
conflict is increasing around the globe (29). In addition, religious categories offer the 
advantage of having clearer boundaries and definitions that are more consistent across 
countries (compared to ethnic or linguistic diversity). For these reasons, this form of 
diversity is often a stronger predictor of societal outcomes compared with ethnic and 
linguistic diversity (30). 
Drawing on representative national surveys, we assess how religious diversity affects 
perceptions of the quality of life, a robust indicator that allows us to disentangle the multiple 
positive and negative effects of diversity on individual wellbeing. We hypothesize that 
changes in religious diversity in the short-term are associated with lower trust in others and 
a poorer quality of life, but that, with time, intergroup contact emerges to counteract these 
initial negative outcomes, leading to an improved perceived quality of life.  
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Main analysis  
Our data come from multiple waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), the 
European Social Survey (ESS), and the Latino Barometro (LB), each of which contains 
comparable measures of happiness, life satisfaction, and self-reported health that we 
combined to form a quality of life index. These datasets together allow an analysis of more 
than 100 countries and 20 years of data, constituting one of the largest diversity studies to 
date. We measure religious diversity for each country and year using the Herfindahl index 
(31), which indicates the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to 
different groups (Fig. 1). To test our hypotheses, we follow a multilevel procedure for 
analyzing cross-sectional time-series data. For each survey we fitted an identical three-level 
multilevel model [see equation 1] in which respondents (i) were nested within years (t), 
which, in turn, were nested within countries (j). Religious diversity was considered as a 
characteristic of specific country-years indexed as tj. With this model specification it is 
possible to test a cross-sectional effect by calculating the mean of xtj across all available 
years for each country. To capture the effect of change within each country, we subtracted xj 
from xtj, which yields a longitudinal component xtjM that is group-mean centered and 
orthogonal to xj (32, 33). With such specification it is possible to disaggregate religious 
diversity into a between-country coefficient (time-invariant) and a within-country 
coefficient (time-variant). Following other research examining contextual effects on well-
being (34), we use the within-country change coefficient to measure the short-term effects of 
increasing diversity, and the between-country cross-sectional coefficient to assess the long-
term effects of diversity. We estimated random intercepts. 
               yitj = β0 + β1xitj + β2xtjM + β3̅xj + β4timetj + uj + utj + eitj          [1] 
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To create our quality of life measure, we computed our multilevel model within a 
structural equation modeling (SEM) framework. With this technique, we estimated, at the 
individual level, the effects of all controls on life satisfaction, happiness, and self-reported 
health. We then used these three quality of life indicators to compose a quality of life latent 
variable that was incorporated at higher analytical levels. This technique permitted modeling 
individual unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variables that could be correlated with 
changes in key variables over time (35).  
As controls, in all surveys we include a range of pertinent individual (e.g., education, 
religious affiliation) and contextual (e.g., country wealth and economic inequality) variables. 
To achieve an exact replication across surveys, only variables present in all datasets were 
included (for further details about the surveys, control variables, and modeling technique, 
see “SI Appendix”)).  
Results. Available data from the WVS (68 countries, 142 country-years from 1981 through 
2014, and 160,645 respondents) reveals that after 1995 there were short-term fluctuations in 
religious diversity around the world until 2000. Thereafter diversity increased every year 
and then peaked in 2004. In contrast, average quality of life followed the opposite trend, 
moving downward to reach its lowest score in the same year (Fig. 2). Whereas a short-term 
perspective focusing on the period between 2000 and 2004 might suggest a correlation 
between both variables, if we examine the full length of data represented, there is no clear 
association between religious diversity and quality of life – a distinction between short- and 
long-term effects that we substantiated through our multilevel analysis. Results show that 
within-country changes in religious diversity are negatively associated with self-reported 
quality of life (b = −0.393, SE = 0.178, P = 0.027; Fig. 3A), while the slope for between-
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country differences in religious diversity is not statistically different from zero (b = 0.006, 
SE = 0.077, P = 0.938). 
Analysis of the ESS (27 countries, 70 country-years from 2002 to 2014, and 126,634 
respondents) replicates the foregoing results, finding that within-country changes in 
religious diversity are negatively associated with quality of life (b = −1.072, SE = 0.412, P = 
0.009; Fig. 3B), with between-country differences in religious diversity having no 
significant influence (b = −0.109, SE = 0.114, P = 0.336). Analysis with the LB (18 
countries, 71 country-years from 1997 to 2015, and 51,401 respondents) also yields a 
negative association between within-country changes in religious diversity and quality of 
life (b = −1.473, SE = 0.634, P = 0.020; Fig. 3C) and a non-significant association for 
between-country differences in religious diversity (b = 0.294, SE = 0.518, P = 0.571). For 
detailed results with all surveys see Tables S4, S5, and S6. In the three surveys, the 
influence of within-country changes on quality of life differs from that of between-country 
changes (WVS: b = 0.399, SE = 0.180, P = 0.027; ESS: b = 0.964, SE = 0.483, P = 0.046; 
LB: b = 1.767, SE = 0.840, P = 0.035). We considered alternative controls and measures for 
the three surveys and these results always persisted (see “SI Appendix”). 
Mediation analysis  
To test in further detail the mechanisms by which religious diversity relates to 
quality of life and how these processes evolve over time, we include trust and intergroup 
contact measures as mediating variables. These indicators were present only in wave 7 of 
the ESS, which also contained a wide range of measures (e.g., citizenship and household 
details) that we controlled at the individual level in addition to controls used in our previous 
analysis (for details, see “SI Appendix”). To analyze effects of change with just one wave of 
data, we used the religious diversity data from our main analysis with a different model 
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specification [see equation 2]. In this multilevel model, individual respondents (indexed i) 
were nested within countries (indexed j), with each country having a random intercept (or 
group-level disturbance) Uj. 
yij = β0 + β1xij + β2xj + uj + eij                  [2] 
We estimated this model twice. First, we fitted a multilevel model that estimated 
short-term change by examining a 2-year period (the shortest possible gap in this survey). In 
this analysis, we calculated the difference between religious diversity from wave 6 (2012) to 
wave 7 (2014), controlling for levels of religious diversity at wave 6. Second, with the same 
procedure, we estimated longer-term change by examining a 12-year period (the widest 
possible gap in this survey series). We calculated the difference between religious diversity 
indices in wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014), controlling for levels of religious diversity at 
wave 1. As in our main analysis, we used structural equation modeling to create latent 
variables for trust and intergroup contact at the contextual level using individual-level data. 
These variables are essential for testing indirect effects between religious diversity and 
quality of life.  
With this approach, we tested an indirect effect via trust, which is the product of the 
direct effects (a) and (a’ ) (Fig. 4). It reflects how much of the association between changes 
in religious diversity and quality of life is explained by trust. The indirect effect via 
intergroup contact is the product of the direct effects (b) and (b’ ), indicating how much the 
association between changes in religious diversity and quality of life is explained by 
intergroup contact. Drawing on the contact hypothesis (36), we tested the possibility that the 
increased intergroup contact emerging with diversity could increase trust and, in turn, have a 
positive impact on quality of life. This was calculated by the product of the direct effects (b), 
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(d), and (a’ ). To understand whether intergroup contact could fully counteract the negative 
effect via trust, we examined a total indirect effect calculated by the sum of all three indirect 
effects. 
Results. Our analysis of changes in religious diversity over a two-year period (21 countries, 
33,719 respondents) indicates that the indirect effect through trust was a significant mediator 
(indirect effect = -0.496, SE = 0.129, P < 0.001). There were, however, no effects of 
religious diversity on intergroup contact (Fig. 4A) and the total indirect effect of religious 
diversity on quality of life is negative, indirect effect = -0.395, SE = 0.165, P = 0.016. The 
lower levels of trust associated with short-term changes explain the negative effects of 
diversity on quality of life. 
Our second model, examining a longer-term effect replicates the mediation via trust 
and reveals an additional mediation via intergroup contact (indirect effects = -0.126, SE = 
0.050, P = 0.013 and 0.045, SE = 0.013, P = 0.001, respectively—see Fig. 4B). An analysis 
testing whether contact with outgroup members improved levels of trust confirms that part 
of the positive effect of diversity on quality of life is due to intergroup contact improving 
trust (indirect effect = 0.007, SE = 0.002, P = 0.003). An analysis of the total indirect effect 
yields a null result, confirming that religious diversity no longer has a significant negative 
effect on quality of life (indirect effect = -0.073, SE = 0.055, P = 0.183). We find a null 
result of the direct effect of religious diversity on quality of life (b = 0.536, SE = 0.279, P = 
0.054) and a null result of the total effect, comprising the direct effect and all indirect effects 
(b = 0.464, SE = 0.314, P = 0.140).  
With a 12-year gap analysis, trust and intergroup contact emerge as two opposing 
mechanisms (i.e., negative and positive, respectively) by which religious diversity relates to 
quality of life. Although reduced trust exerts a negative effect, the positive valence of 
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increasing intergroup contact mitigates initial negative effects of religious diversity on 
quality of life (for a full description of the mediation models, fit indices, and coefficients, 
see “SI Appendix, Table S8, Fig. S1”). We considered alternative explanations and 
undertook additional analysis to account for gaps between wave 7 and all remaining waves, 
and all results supported our argument and findings (see “SI Appendix”). 
Discussion 
The foregoing analyses offer one of the richest and most extensive studies of 
religious diversity completed to date, not only in terms of the wide range of countries and 
contexts included, but also because of its empirical depth in examining the mechanisms 
underlying the complex effects of religious diversity. Our findings are consistent across a 
wide range of countries and independently collected datasets. Results support models of 
human evolution in showing evidence of how both tendencies for ingroup association and 
outgroup orientation unfold in today’s context of unprecedented demographic changes.  
These findings provide for some evidence-based optimism in showing that, despite 
initial resistance, human beings can cope with the challenges posed by religious diversity. 
This optimism is perhaps less likely to be shared among citizens starting to experience these 
changes and their initial negative effects. Although some pessimism would eventually 
dissipate as individuals start benefiting from intergroup contact, it is important to note that 
the intervention of political leaders during a stage of profound change can modify the 
processes discussed in our findings. In contexts of change, anti-immigration narratives will 
be particularly powerful given that they will trigger some of the most basic human instincts 
such as those of ingroup protection and survival. At the same time, compared to these 
immediate negative effects, the positive outcomes occur at a slower pace and are more 
difficult to observe. These factors together can create a favorable context for the rise of 
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nationalism, protectionism, and opposition to immigration, which politicians all too often 
instigate to mobilize political support.  
A topic that deserves further discussion is the timeframe involved in the processes 
revealed in our findings. In additional analysis in the “SI Appendix”, we show that negative 
effects of religious diversity dissipate after an 8-year period in the ESS (Fig. S4), while in 
the WVS and LB they require 6- and 4-year periods to dissipate (Fig. S2 and Fig. S3, 
respectively). This variation could be due to a wealth of contextual factors affecting the 
mechanisms by which religious diversity influences quality of life. One factor could be, for 
example, the existence of favorable integration policies for immigrants, allowing newcomers 
to blend more smoothly into host societies. A successful integration of new religious groups 
should facilitate intergroup contact that, as we show, is critical for attenuating negative 
effects of social diversity.  
Other potential contextual factors include barriers to intergroup contact such as the 
presence of strong religious conflict or discrimination against specific religious groups, 
which would reduce opportunities for mixing and thereby slow down the positive path that 
mitigates initial reactions to diversity. Compared to other world regions, Europe contains a 
greater number of religiously homogeneous countries (see Fig. 1). The slower timeframe at 
which the negative effects of religious diversity are counteracted in the ESS might be due to 
homogeneous societies needing more time to cope with these demographic changes, 
compared to diverse societies that are also changing, but that already contain some 
intergroup contact networks. 
We acknowledge the limitations of our research in testing the mediating role of 
intergroup contact. Although our mediation analysis referred to the ‘direct’ and indirect 
effects’ of religious diversity, which is conventional language for this type of analyses, we 
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emphasize that the underlying data ultimately consist of cross-sectional surveys, ruling out 
causal inferences about the underlying associations. However, tests of alternative 
causal relations provide some additional support to our hypothesized direction of 
causality (for these tests and a more detailed discussion about causality, see SI Appendix).  
In addition, the only measure available in the European Social Survey assessed the 
frequency of contact with people of a different racial or ethnic background, not different 
religious affiliations. This limitation is somewhat mitigated, however, given that religion 
and ethnicity are deeply connected (37). This is noticeable in the European context of the 
ESS where, in most countries, majority ethnic groups are associated with a majority religion 
and people affiliated with other religions tend to be immigrants and individuals of a different 
ethnic/racial background. For this reason, increasing religious diversity should be associated 
with more opportunities for contact with both other religious groups and other ethnic/racial 
groups. This reasoning is consistent with our data, which indicate that increasing religious 
diversity is, in the long-term, associated with individuals having more contact with others of 
a different ethnic/racial background.  
Religious diversity is on the increase all around the world and presents one of the 
defining challenges of modern societies (38). Although humans can cope with these changes 
in the longer term, faith-based conflict is increasing around the globe (29). Apart from the 
influence of the demographic changes examined in our research, there are key historical and 
contextual factors motivating religious conflict in specific parts of the world. Examining 
these areas of conflict and the associated contextual characteristics could shed light on the 
factors that might disrupt an apparent benign human ability to cope with these challenges. 
Our findings and their implications should enlighten ill-informed political debates, which 
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have often promoted hostility not kindness, violence not respect, and conflict rather than 
peace.  
Materials and Methods 
Measures. In both main and mediation analyses we used measures of religious 
diversity and quality of life. For the mediation analysis we added generalized trust and 
intergroup contact measures. Tests of the metric quality of our measures are reported in 
additional analyses in the “SI Appendix”.  
Religious diversity. Although researchers have used several measures of diversity 
[for a review, see (39)], here we used the Herfindahl index [3], which is also known as the 
fractionalization index. We chose this index because it is the most popular measure of 
diversity for comparative research (40) and allows us to compare our results directly with 
scholarship in the field. For each country at every point in time, religious diversity was 
calculated as follows: 
      [3] 
where Si is the proportion of people who profess religion i in country j. This index ranges 
between 0 and 1, indicating the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a 
country belong to different religious groups. The index increases with both the number of 
religious groups and the evenness of the distribution of individuals across groups.  
The proportion of different social groups is typically estimated using sources such as 
the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Atlas Naradov Mira from the 1960’s (40). Although 
this method has been found to be appropriate for cross-sectional analysis, in our study it 
creates two problems. The first is that diversity measures based on these data sources are 
outdated and do not match the contextual reality of people responding to the surveys in 
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recent survey waves. The second issue is that it does not allow us to assess religious 
diversity consistently across different waves to examine effects of change. To overcome 
these problems, we estimated the proportion of individuals in each religious group using 
respondents’ own reports to survey interviewers. Given that all samples are representative 
and statistical weights are provided to adjust for sampling error, the proportion of 
individuals per religious group in these datasets provides an accurate and reliable estimate of 
their relative numbers in society. 
In the WVS, data on religious affiliation were obtained from responses to the 
question, “Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?” The 
options provided were Buddhist, Evangelical, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, 
Roman Catholic, and Other. In the ESS, respondents were asked, “Do you consider yourself 
as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” and responses included Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Islamic, 
Eastern religions, and Other Non-Christian religion. The LB asked, “What is your religion?” 
and responses included Catholic, Evangelical without specifications, Evangelic Baptist, 
Evangelic Methodist, Evangelic Pentecostal, Adventist, Jehovah Witness, Mormon, Jewish, 
Protestant, Afro-American Cult, Spiritist, Christian, and Other (the survey also included 
Muslim, Orthodox, and Buddhist as options but no individuals reported belonging to these 
religions). 
We applied the Herfindahl formula [3] to the proportion of individuals in each 
religious group, estimated using the sampling weights provided by each survey. Using this 
approach, we were able to compute indices of religious diversity for each survey year in 
each country (see “SI Appendix, Tables S1, S2, S3”). Although all surveys included a no 
religious denomination option, we did not include the proportion of individuals under this 
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category in computing our index [for an identical strategy, see (41)]. We considered that the 
absence of a religious faith is not a form of religion and, for this reason, should not be 
included in our index along with actual religious affiliations. We assume that individuals are 
more threatened by other religious denominations that communicate competing values, 
norms, and ideologies than by non-religious individuals often sharing the same cultural 
background. To be more certain of this approach, we considered including the proportion of 
non-religious individuals in our main model but found no differences in our results (see 
additional analysis in “SI Appendix”).  
Quality of life. We assessed quality of life with multiple measures of well-being and 
self-reported health available from the surveys. The measurement of well-being included 
questions tapping into happiness (an emotional component) and satisfaction (a cognitive 
component), which constitute standard measures of well-being (42). Self-reported health 
was measured using a standard general health question. Some of the items below were 
reverse-coded, so that for all measures a higher score indicated better well-being and health 
(for a detailed account of the reasons for including these indicators of quality of life, see “SI 
Appendix”).  
In the WVS three specific questions measured quality of life: “Taking all things 
together, would you say you are happy?” (with answers ranging from 1 “very happy” to 4 
“not at all happy”); “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?” (with answers ranging from 1 “completely dissatisfied” to 10 “completely 
satisfied”); and “All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?” (with 
answers ranging from 1 “very good” to 4 “poor).  
The ESS asked the three following questions: “Taking all things together, how happy 
would you say you are?” (with answers ranging from 1 “extremely unhappy” to 10 
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“extremely happy”); “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
nowadays?” (with answers ranging from 0 “extremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely 
satisfied”); and “How is your health in general?” (with answers ranging from 1 “very good” 
to 5 “very bad”).  
The LB’s happiness question was only asked in two of the survey waves and, for this 
reason, was discarded from our analyses. Instead we measured quality of life with two 
items. The first assessed life satisfaction with the question: “In general, would you say that 
you are satisfied with your life?” (with answers ranging from 1 “very satisfied” to 4 “not at 
all satisfied”). The second item addressed health by asking: “Over the past 12 months, 
would you say your physical health has been very good, good, average, poor or very poor?” 
(with answers ranging from 1 “very good” to 5 “very poor”). Unfortunately, the LB only 
asked the health question in five waves (i.e., Wave 6 in 2001; Wave 9 in 2004; Wave 10 in 
2005; Wave 11 in 2006; and Wave 12, 2007) and thus, to preserve comparability between 
surveys, our analysis focused only on these five waves. As specified in our main analysis, 
for the WVS and the ESS, the three components were aggregated using a latent variable 
approach. Our modeling approach to the LB was somewhat different given that in this 
survey we were restricted to two indicators of quality of life and a smaller sample size. To 
overcome this issue, with the LB we averaged the individual responses to the life 
satisfaction and health questions to create a measure of quality of life. Both variables were 
standardized prior to averaging. Similar to our modeling approach for the WVS and ESS, 
this quality of life measure was decomposed into a latent between-level variable.   
Measures used in the mediation analysis. Much diversity research has focused on 
social capital and social cohesion captured by generalized trust – the placing of trust in 
others. Generalized trust was measured in Wave 7 of the ESS with three items: “Most 
18 
 
people can be trusted or you can't be too careful” (the answers ranged from 1 “you can’t be 
too careful” to 10 “most people can be trusted”); “Do you think most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair” (answers ranged 
from 0 “most people would try to take advantage of me” to 10 “most people would try to be 
fair”); and “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are 
mostly looking out for themselves” (answers ranged from 0 “people mostly look out for 
themselves” to 10 “people mostly try to be helpful”). Answers to these three questions were 
averaged to produce a generalized trust variable with a higher score indicating more trust (α 
= 0.76, with only one factor emerging and explaining 67% of the variance).  
Intergroup contact was measured with the following item: “How often do you have 
any contact with people who are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country 
identifier] people when you are out and about? This could be on public transport, in the 
street, in shops or in the neighborhood" (the answers ranged from 1 “Never” to 7 “Every 
day”). 
Quality of life was measured with the same ESS items as in the main analysis. The 
questions about happiness, life satisfaction, and self-reported health were standardized and 
then averaged. A higher score in this variable indicated better quality of life (α = 0.73, with 
only one factor emerging and explaining 65% of the variance).  
In the mediation analysis, the resulting sample with the ESS was identical in size to 
the LB sample and, as such, we followed the LB’s modeling strategy. We standardized and 
averaged the individual responses to the questions about generalized trust, intergroup 
contact, and quality of life. These individual-level variables were then created at the higher 
level using a structural equation modeling latent variable approach as in the main analysis 
(for a detailed description of our modeling strategy, see “SI Appendix”).  
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Figure Legends: 
Fig. 1. Religious diversity in the World Values Survey (1990-2012), European Social 
Survey (2002-2010), and Latino Barametro (2004-2007). The dots indicate average levels of 
diversity across all waves of each survey (0 indicates complete homogeneity, 1 complete 
diversity), whilst error bars represent lowest and highest diversity scores in each country. 
 
Fig. 2. Changes in religious diversity and average quality of life across time in 68 countries 
(1995-2012) in the World Values Survey. Both variables are centered. Quality of life scores 
were adjusted for individual and country level controls (see “SI Appendix”).  
 
Fig. 3. The effect of changes in religious diversity on quality of life in the World Values 
Survey (A), European Social Survey (B), and Latino Barometro (C). The plotted values are 
the deviations of each country’s religious diversity in a given year from its average value. 
Quality of life scores were centered to the grand mean and adjusted for both individual and 
contextual controls. 
 
Fig. 4. Multi-level mediation model testing the short-term (A) and long-term (B) effects of 
changes of diversity on quality of life, mediated by intergroup contact and trust. All 
coefficients are unstandardized and adjusted for individual and contextual controls. Letters 
within parentheses illustrate the paths used in our indirect effects analysis.   
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Fig. 1. Religious diversity in the World Values Survey (1990-2012), European Social 
Survey (2002-2010), and Latino Barametro (2004-2007). The dots indicate average levels of 
diversity across all waves of each survey (0 indicates complete homogeneity, 1 complete 
diversity), whilst error bars represent lowest and highest diversity scores in each country. 
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Fig. 2. Changes in religious diversity and average quality of life across time in 68 countries 
(1995-2012) in the World Values Survey. Both variables are centered. Quality of life scores 
were adjusted for individual and country level controls (see SI Appendix).  
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Fig. 3. The effect of changes in religious diversity on quality of life in the World Values 
Survey (A), European Social Survey (B), and Latino Barometro (C). The plotted values are 
the deviations of each country’s religious diversity in a given year from its average value. 
Quality of life scores were centered to the grand mean and adjusted for both individual and 
contextual controls. 
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Fig. 4. Multi-level mediation model testing the short-term (A) and long-term (B) effects of 
changes of diversity on quality of life, mediated by intergroup contact and trust. All 
coefficients are unstandardized and adjusted for individual and contextual controls. Letters 
within parentheses illustrate the paths used in our indirect effects analysis. 
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